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of the outcome. First, we derive the condition for Pareto optimal
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11 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change stipulates the limitation or reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the developed countries and others for ﬁve years from 2008 to 2012
according to the quantiﬁed commitments. The limitation of greenhouse gas
emissions after this period, however, is not determined yet, and it will soon
become the most important issue of international negotiations. In this paper,
we build a model of international negotiations for reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions with emission permits trading, and examine whether a coop-
erative agreement can be reached, and moreover a Pareto optimal allocation
can be attained at the cooperative agreement if any.
Although every country places a positive value on reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions, marginal willingness to sacriﬁce its own consumption for im-
provement of the environment may vary among countries. For such a proﬁle
of the valuation functions of the countries over consumption and greenhouse
gas emissions, which we call the welfare functions of the countries, we de-
rive the condition for the Pareto optimal levels of greenhouse gas emissions,
production and consumption.
A new feature of our model is that it takes account of emissions of green-
house gases from consumption activities as well as from production activities.
It is important to incorporate emissions from consumption in the present
model because under the trading system of emission permits, production and
consumption may take place in diﬀerent countries. For instance, if Russia
sells a lot of permits, it consumes more than it produces, emitting more gases
from consumption. Our condition for Pareto optimality is the extension of
the celebrated Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson condition and Chichilnisky et al.’s
(2000) result to the case where consumption of commodities also generates
the public bad.
Next, we introduce a three-stage model of international negotiations and
emission permits trading. In the ﬁrst stage, all the countries negotiate on
the level of total emissions of greenhouse gases, given the distribution rule
of the permits. In the second stage, each country determines its domestic
rule on requirements for emission permits. In the third stage, the market of
emission permits is open, and an equilibrium price of a permit is established.
At the equilibrium, each country produces and consumes commodities, and
emits the amount of greenhouse within the limit determined in the ﬁrst stage.
Hence, the total amount of emission permits determines the equilibrium level
2of consumption of each country, and thereby its ﬁnal welfare level.
We analyze how the limitation of the total amount of greenhouse gas
emissions aﬀects the consumption of each country. In particular, we take into
account the “feedback eﬀect”: an increase in the amount of emission permits
for a country may raise the consumption of the country, but not as much
as the same amount because the increase in consumption itself accompany
greenhouse gas emissions, requiring additional permits.
Based on the analysis, we apply the Nash bargaining theory (Nash, 1950)
to the negotiations in the ﬁrst stage of the model. We draw the bargaining
frontier, namely the locus of welfare vectors of the countries attained through
a choice of the total amount of emission permits. We show that parts of the
bargaining frontier are strictly below the Pareto frontier, namely the locus
of welfare vectors that are technologically feasible.
Then, we deﬁne the disagreement point by the vector of welfare levels of
the countries at a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative emission game where
no regulation is imposed on emissions. We show that if the distribution rule
of initial emission permits is the proportional rule to the Nash equilibrium
emission levels in the noncooperative emission game, then the disagreement
point is inside the bargaining frontier. For many other distribution rules,
however, the disagreement point is located outside the bargaining frontier,
in which cases no cooperative agreement can be reached. Even if it is inside
the bargaining frontier, the Nash bargaining solution (or any other bargaining
solution) may not be Pareto optimal because the bargaining frontier is below
the Pareto frontier.
There are several related works to this paper. Most closely related are
Chichilnisky et al.’s (2000) and Prat (2000). Chichilnisky et al.’s (2000) con-
sidered the case where the total amount of emission permits is ﬁxed, and
obtained a striking result that almost all distributions of the initial permits
are incompatible with Pareto optimality of the ﬁnal allocation. Prat (2000),
like the present paper, studied the case in which the distribution rule of
the initial permits is given, and showed that, under some regularity condi-
tions, only one level of total emissions is compatible with Pareto optimality
of the ﬁnal allocation. Prat also proved that the preferences of each country
is single-peaked as to the levels of total emissions, and hence, by the me-
dian voter theorem, there exists a unique winning level of total emissions in
majority voting.
Diﬀerences of the present paper from these works are as follows: First,
we take account of emissions of greenhouse gases not only from production
3but also from consumption. Second, we apply the Nash bargaining theory
to international negotiations on the levels of total emissions, instead of the
theory of majority voting. It is often the case that international negotiations
for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions break down without any agreement.
The Nash bargaining theory is useful to explain why it is so diﬃcult to reach
an agreement in the negotiations.
Okada (2003) presented a two-stage game model of international nego-
tiations on emission permits, which is similar to our model. However, he
assumed that the total amount of emission permits is ﬁxed, and considered
negotiations on distributions of the ﬁxed total amount among countries. He
showed that the core of the voting game on distributions of emission per-
mits is empty. In contrast, we assume that a distribution rule of permits
among countries is given, and focus on negotiations about the level of global
emissions.1
There are two issues in the abatement of global warming. One is the level
of global emissions of greenhouse gases, and the other is the distribution of
initial emission permits among countries. When there are multiple issues
in negotiations, participants often try to make an agreement issue by issue.
Hence, we may consider two procedures in negotiations such as follows:
(i) First the countries determine the total amount of emissions, and then
they negotiate on distributions of the total.
(ii) First the countries agree on a distribution rule, and then they decide the
total amount of emissions.2
This paper focuses on the procedure of type (ii). A possible scenario of
procedure (ii) may be described as follows, using the negotiations for the
Kyoto protocol as an example. The countries ﬁrst agree (implicitly) on the
relative burdens of reduction of greenhouse gases. For instance, the reduction
rate for Japan should be one percent lower than that for the United States,
which should in turn be one percent lower than that for the European Union,
and so on. Then, assuming this distribution rule is (implicitly) accepted,
they agree that the total emissions should be reduced by 5.2 percent below
1Recent contributions which shed light on other aspects of international negotiations
and agreements on climate change are Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), Helm
(2003), Lange and Vogt (2003), and Shiell (2003).
2There have been long debates on which distribution rules are fair or just, a proportional
rule to past emissions, to GDPs, to populations, or to the costs of reducing emissions? In
this paper, we will not study this normative issue, but consider various cases of distribution
rules.
4the 1990 level. This agreement then determines the absolute value of the
reduction rate for each country (6 percent for Japan, 7 percent for the US,
and 8 percent for EU).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the basic assumptions on technology and preferences of each country. In
section 3 we show the extension of the Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson condition
and Chichilnisky et al.’s (2000) result on Pareto optimal allocations. Section
4 presents and analyzes the three-stage model on international negotiations
and emission permits trading. In section 5 we examine the bargaining fron-
tier and the disagreement point in international negotiations, and discuss the
possibility of a cooperative agreement and the Pareto optimality of the out-
come. Section 6 presents numerical examples in which the Nash bargaining
solution is not Pareto optimal, and section 7 concludes.
2 Technology and preferences
There are n countries, N = f1;:::;ng. Let yi 2 R+ denote the gross domestic
product (GDP) of country i 2 N, ci 2 R+ the consumption of country i. Both
production and consumption are accompanied by emissions of greenhouse
gases. Let x
p
i 2 R+ denote the emission of greenhouse gases from production.
The relation of x
p
i and yi is represented by the function x
p
i = fi(yi), where
f0
i > 0, f00
i > 0. Let xc
i 2 R+ denote the emission of greenhouse gases
from consumption. The relation of xc
i and ci is represented by the function
xc
i = gi(c), where g0
i > 0, g00
i ¸ 0. Let xi := x
p
i + xc
i be the total emission of
greenhouse gases of country i, and let X :=
P
i2N xi be the level of global
emissions of greenhouse gases.
Each country i has preferences over pairs (ci;X) 2 R2
+ of its own consump-
tion and an amount of global emissions of greenhouse gases. The preferences
are represented by a continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly quasi-concave
function Vi : R2
+ ! R. We call the function Vi the welfare function of coun-
try i.
The partial derivative of Vi with respect to the variable a is denoted by
DaVi. We assume that DcVi > 0 and DXVi < 0. We also assume that
for every X 2 R+, limci!0
DXVi(ci;X)
DcVi(ci;X) = 0. This assumption means that the
marginal willingness to sacriﬁce consumption for reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions approaches zero as the amount of consumption goes to zero.
53 Pareto optimal allocations
A greenhouse gas is a public “bad” in the sense that an increase in green-
house gas emissions makes every country worse oﬀ. There are several fea-
tures of emissions of greenhouse gases that are distinct from other public
goods or bads. First, every country produces the public bad (greenhouse
gases) through both production and consumption of commodities. For exam-
ple, suppose that country A produces automobiles and country B imports
them. Then, not only country A but also country B increases its emission of
greenhouse gases by driving more automobiles.
Second, the relation of emission of greenhouse gases to production or con-
sumption varies widely among countries, depending on technology. For in-
stance, to attain a given level of production, Japan emits a relatively smaller
amount of greenhouse gases than Russia because Japan has developed tech-
nology to save oil and other resources.
The celebrated Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson condition (Samuelson, 1954)
states that at a Pareto optimal allocation, the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution between the (composite) commodity and the public good over
all individuals should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation be-
tween the two goods. Chichilnisky et al.(2000) extended the Lindahl-Bowen-
Samuelson condition to the case where the public good (bad) is greenhouse
gas emission. However, they assume that only production generates green-
house gases. Next we derive the conditions for Pareto optimal allocations in
the present model where consumption of commodities also produces green-
house gases.
An allocation is a vector (y;c;x) := (y1;:::;yn;c1;:::;cn;x1;:::;xn) 2
R3n






(ii) for every j 2 N, xj = f(yj) + g(cj).
We say that an allocation (y;c;x) Pareto dominates an allocation (˜ y;˜ c; ˜ x) if
and only if
(i) for every j 2 N, Vj(cj;
P
h2N xh) ¸ Vj(˜ cj;
P
h2N ˜ xh), and
(ii) for some j 2 N, Vj(cj;
P
h2N xh) > Vj(˜ cj;
P
h2N ˜ xh).
An allocation (y¤;c¤;x¤) is Pareto optimal if and only if it is technologi-
cally feasible and there is no technologically feasible allocation that Pareto
dominates it.
Let (y¤;c¤;x¤) À 0 be a Pareto optimal allocation. For each j 2 N,




h) 2 R. Let i 2 N be given. Then, (y¤;c¤;x¤) is a
















8j 2 N;j 6= i; Vj(cj;
X
h2N
xh) = ¯ Vj (3)

























































i) ¡ ± = 0 (6)



































j) ¡ ± = 0 (9)
From equations (5) and (7), °i = °j for all i;j 2 N. Hence, from equations




j) for all i;j 2 N. Thus, we have the following
result.
7Proposition 1 Production Eﬃciency. At a Pareto optimal allocation,
the marginal emission from production is the same for all the countries.


































The value ´i(ci;X) is the absolute value of country i’s marginal rate of sub-


















j)) = 1 (11)
Proposition 2 At a Pareto optimal allocation, the weighted sum of the
marginal rates of substitution of consumption for global emission of green-
house gases over all the countries is equal to one where each weight is the
sum of the marginal emission from production and the marginal emission
from consumption in each country.




j) for all i;j 2 N. Hence, if there is no
external eﬀect of consumption of commodities, that is, g0
i = 0 for all i 2 N,



















i ) is the marginal rate of transformation between consumption
of commodities and emission of greenhouse gases, and the above equation
coincides with Chichilnisky et al.’s (2000) condition. In other words, our
condition is an extension of theirs to the case where consumption of com-
modities has also an external eﬀect on the production of the public bad (or
good).
84 Three-stage model of international negoti-
ations and trades
In this section, we consider a three-stage model of international negotiations
and emission permits trading. We assume that that a distribution rule of
emission permits among countries is given. The rule may be the propor-
tional rule to the levels of GDP at a benchmark year, the proportional rule
to populations, or the proportional rule to the costs of reducing greenhouse
gas gases, etc. In the ﬁrst stage, all the countries negotiate on the total
amount of emissions of greenhouse gases, given the distribution rule of emis-
sion permits. In the second stage, each country determines the domestic rule
on the requirement for emission permits. In the third stage, ﬁrms and con-
sumers act so as to maximize their objectives, and the levels of production,
consumption and emissions of greenhouse gases are determined at a market
equilibrium.
4.1 Equilibrium in the market of emission permits
To analyze the game backward, we ﬁrst focus on market equilibria of emission
permits in the third stage of the game. At a given price of the permit, how
is the demand for emission permits determined?
Consider the following policy of the government of country i 2 N.
Policy (A): the government requires that each producer should obtain emis-
sion permits at the international price for the amount of greenhouse gases
emitted in the process of production, and that each consumer should also
obtain permits for the amount emitted in the process of consumption of the
commodity.
A point in this policy is that each producer should be responsible only for
greenhouse gases emitted in the process of production, and should not be
responsible for those emitted in the process of consumption of its product.
Later we will see that the policy (A) is indeed an optimal choice of the
government at the second stage.
Let q 2 R+ be the international price of an emission permit. Then, the
marginal revenue of production is one since the price of the (composite) com-
modity is one, while the marginal cost of production due to the requirement
for emission permits is q f0(y) under the above policy. Hence, from proﬁt
9maximization of ﬁrms, the level of production in country i, denoted y¤
i, is
determined by




Given a level of production, the level of consumption is determined by
the equivalence between the national income and the national expenditure.3
Let ¯ xi 2 R+ be the initial assignment of emission permits to country i 2 N.
Let q 2 R+ be a given international price of the emission permit. When the
levels of production and consumption are yi and ci, respectively, the total
amount of emissions of greenhouse gases in country i is fi(yi)+gi(ci). Then,
the revenue from (or the expenditure for, if it is negative) emission permits
is equal to q (¯ xi ¡ fi(yi) ¡ gi(ci)). Thus, the national income is given by
yi +q (¯ xi ¡fi(yi)¡gi(ci)). This should be equal to the national expenditure
ci. We therefore say that a consumption-production pair (ci;yi) is feasible
with emission permits trading for country i at q and ¯ xi if and only if
ci = yi + q (¯ xi ¡ fi(yi) ¡ gi(ci)): (14)
For each ci 2 R+, since 1 + q g0
i(ci) > 0, by the implicit function theorem,
equation (14) can be locally solved for ci as a function of yi. Denote the
function ci(yi). For each yi 2 R+, ci(yi) 2 R+ is the level of consumption
when the level of production is yi.
Let us turn to the second stage of the game in which the government of
each country determines the domestic rule on emission permits trading. We
assume that for each i 2 N, the objective of the government of country i is
to maximize its welfare Vi. In the second stage of the game, however, the
government of country i regards the level of global emissions of greenhouse
gases as ﬁxed since it is determined in international negotiations in the ﬁrst
stage. Hence, in order to maximize Vi, it should choose a policy or a rule
that will maximize its domestic consumption in the third stage.
To ﬁnd such a rule or a policy, it is necessary to examine how the level of





1 ¡ q f0
i(yi)








[1 + q g0
i(ci(yi))]2 (16)
3Notice that in the present model, there is only one (composite) commodity.
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If there were no requirement to obtain emission permits, an increase in yi
raises consumption by the same amount. With the requirement for emission
permits, however, a unit of increase in yi induces more payment for emission
permits, and therefore can increase consumption by less than one unit as
shown in equation (15).
Let y¤
i be the level of production of country i that maximizes its own
consumption. By equation (16), c00
i(yi) < 0 whenever c0
i(yi) = 0. Hence, the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for a local optimum, y¤
i, is c0
i(y¤
i) = 0. By







In general, one unit of increase in production generates f0
i(yi) units of
emission of greenhouse gases, which increases the payment for (or decreases
the revenue from) emission permits by q f0
i(yi). If consumption also increased,
then more payment for emission permits would be necessary. At the opti-
mum, however, consumption should never increase by the change in produc-
tion. Hence, the increase in production should be just oﬀset by the increase
in the payment for (or the decrease in the revenue from) emission permits
from production. That is why q f0
i(yi) = 1 and equation (17) hold at the
optimal level of production y¤
i.
However, as one notice by comparing equation (17) with equation (13),
the optimal amount y¤
i is exactly the amount of production attained through
proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms under the policy (A). Therefore, to choose this
policy is indeed an optimal choice of the government in the second stage of
the game.
Proposition 3 Consider country i 2 N. In the second stage of the game,
the policy (A) is an optimal choice of the government of country i whose
objective is to maximize the welfare Vi of country i. Under the policy, and
at any given price q of the emission permit, the amount of production y¤
i of







Then the amount of consumption ci(y¤
i) is the maximal amount under the
price q and the initial assignment ¯ xi of emission permits.





q for all i;j 2 N. Hence,
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Any allocation attained in the third stage of the game satisﬁes
the condition of production eﬃciency.
4.2 The demand function for emission permits
Having examined how the production and the consumption of country i are
determined in the third stage of the model, this subsection studies the prop-
erty of the demand function for emission permits of country i. That is, we
investigate how the demand for emission permits changes as the price of the
permit changes.
For each q 2 R+, let yi(q) 2 R+ be the amount of production of country
i at q in the third stage of the game. Since f00(yi) > 0 for all yi 2 R+, the
function 1




i(q) := fi(yi(q)). x
p
i(q) is the emission from production of country
i at q. Deﬁne xc
i(q) := gi(ci(yi(q))). xc
i(q) is the emission from consumption
of country i at q. Let xi(q) := x
p
i(q)+xc
i(q). Then, xi(q) is the gross demand
for emission permits of country i at q.
We would like to examine whether the gross demand for emission permits
is decreasing in q or not. As we have already seen, if q rises, then yi(q)
decreases, and hence x
p
i(q) also decreases. We need to check whether xc
i(q)
is decreasing in q or not.
By deﬁnition, for all q 2 R++,


















Since 1 ¡ q f0
i(yi(q)) = 0 from Proposition 3, we have






i(q) = ¯ xi ¡ fi(yi(q)) ¡ gi(ci(yi(q)))





















i(ci) > 0 for all ci 2 R+, it follows that
dc
dq













This means that if country i is a net supplier of emission permits, then
an increase in the price q induces higher consumption through the income
eﬀect, which then raises the emission from consumption, xc
i. That is, xc
i(q)
is increasing in q. Therefore, it is ambiguous whether the total demand for
emission permits of country i, xi(q) = x
p
i(q) + xc






0(q)j, then the total demand is increasing in q.






0(q) are negative. Thus, the total demand for emission
permits of country i is decreasing in q.
What about the aggregate demand for emission permits? Let XD(q) := P
i2N xi(q) be the aggregate demand for emission permits at q. Since xi(q)
may be increasing or decreasing in q, it is ambiguous in general whether
the aggregate demand XD(q) is decreasing in q or not. However, under an
additional assumption, we can determine the sign of XD0(q) at an equilibrium
price.
Assumtion L (Linearity in Emission from Consumption):
For some constant ® 2 R++, gi(ci) = ®ci for all i 2 N.
Assumption L means that (i) emissions from consumption are propor-
tional to the levels of consumption, and (ii) per unit emissions from con-
sumption are the same for all the countries. While the relations of emissions
of greenhouse gases with production vary widely among countries, depending
on the production technologies to save energies, emissions from consumption
may be nearly proportional to the amount of consumption, and moreover,
the diﬀerences among countries in per unit emissions from consumption seem
small. For example, emissions of greenhouse gases from cooking, heating,
driving, exercising, etc., would be proportional to the amount of consump-
tion, and there is little diﬀerence in per unit emissions among countries.






































































Let q¤ 2 R+ be an equilibrium price of the emission permit when the total
supply of emission permits is a given ¯ X 2 R+. Then,
X
i2N





























Thus, we have obtained the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let q¤ 2 R+ be an equilibrium price of the emission permit.
Under Assumption L, the aggregate demand function for emission permits is
decreasing in a small neighborhood of q¤.
4.3 Maximization of the welfare of each country in in-
ternational negotiations
The previous subsection showed the property of the aggregate demand func-
tion for emission permits. Based on the property, this subsection examines
14how the equilibrium consumption of each country changes as the total supply
of emission permits changes. This reveals a trade-oﬀ between reduction of
greenhouse gases and consumption of each country. Then, for each country,
the condition for an optimal amount of total supply of emission permits is
determined, taking the trade-oﬀ into account.
Let q(X) be the equilibrium price when the total supply of emission
permits is X. It follows form Proposition 4 that q0(X) < 0 under Assumption
L.
We assume that the assignment of emission permits to each country is
proportional to the total supply of emission permits. Let (µ1;:::;µn) 2]0;1[n
with
P
i2N µi = 1 be the proportional factors.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, each country claims how much the total
supply of emission permits should be. Each country tries to maximize its
welfare Vi(ci;X), taking account of the fact that, once the total supply X is
determined in the ﬁrst stage, the production and the consumption of country
i are determined at the equilibrium price q(X) in the ﬁnal stage. Hence, the
welfare of each country is a function of X.
With slight abuse of notation, let ci(X) be the consumption level of coun-








i(X) + DXVi(ci;X): (21)
A change in the total supply of emission permits X aﬀects the welfare of coun-
try i through two routes: one is the direct eﬀect represented by DXVi(ci;X),
and the other is the indirect eﬀect through the change in consumption,
DcVi(ci;X)c0
i(X). To examine how the consumption changes with a change
in X, notice ﬁrst that by feasibility,



















The terms of equation (22) represent the following eﬀects of an increase in
X on ci.
15(i) y0
i(q)q0(X) > 0 : the increase in production due to the fall in q.
(ii) q0(X)[µiX ¡fi(yi)¡gi(ci)]: the change in revenue from (or the payment
for) emission permits due to the fall in q. If country i is a net supplier of
emission permits, then q0(X)[µiX ¡ fi(yi) ¡ gi(ci)] < 0, and if it is a net
demander, q0(X)[µiX ¡ fi(yi) ¡ gi(ci)] > 0.
(iii) q(X)µi > 0: the increase in the revenue from (or the decrease in payment
for) emission permits due to the increase in the initial assignment of emission
permits to country i.
(iv) ¡q(X)[f0
i(yi)y0
i(q)q0(X)] < 0 : the decrease in the revenue from (or the




i(X)]: the change in the revenue from (or the payment for)
emission permits due to the change in emission through consumption.
By Proposition 3, q(X)f0(yi(q(X))) = 1. Hence, the eﬀect (i) is just oﬀset
by the eﬀect (iv). This is because each country maximizes its consumption









i(X) may be called the marginal opportunity cost of reduction of
greenhouse gases for country i in terms of its own consumption under the
system of emission permits trading.










i be the amount of total supply of emission permits that is optimal
for country i, and let y¤
i := yi(q(X¤
i )) and c¤
i := ci(X¤
i ). If X = 0, then ci = 0,
which is clearly not optimal for country i. Hence, X¤
i > 0 and W 0
i(X¤


















Let us summarize the analysis in this subsection as follows.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the initial assignments of emission permits to
the countries are proportional to the total supply X. Let X¤
i be the amount
16of the total supply of emission permits that maximizes the welfare of country
i, and let c¤
i be the level of consumption at q(X¤
i ). At (c¤
i;X¤
i ), country i’s
marginal rate of substitution of its own consumption for global emission of
greenhouse gases is equal to country i’s marginal opportunity cost of reduction
of greenhouse gases in terms of its own consumption under the system of
emission permits trading. The latter is equal to
µiq(X¤









where µi 2]0;1[ is the proportion of the initial assignment of emission permits
to country i.
5 Non-optimality of the bargaining outcome
5.1 The bargaining frontier
As the analyses in the previous sections have shown, once the amount of the
total supply of emission permits is determined in international negotiations in
the ﬁrst stage, an equilibrium price of the emission permit is established in the
market of emission permits, which then determines the level of consumption
of each country. Hence, the welfare level of each country depends solely on
the total supply of emission permits. In other words, by tracing the vector
of welfare levels attained by all the countries at each amount of the total
supply of emission permits, we can draw the welfare possibility frontier of
the international negotiations. Let us call the frontier the bargaining frontier.
This gives the set of feasible welfare vectors in the Nash bargaining theory.
As shown next, however, vectors on the bargaining frontier are not nec-
essarily Pareto optimal. That is, there exists a technologically feasible allo-
cation for which the welfare of every country is at least as good as at the
vector on the bargaining frontier, and the welfare of some country is strictly
higher. We show this fact by focusing on the the level of the total supply of
emission permits that maximizes the welfare of one country. Such a level of
the total supply clearly supports a welfare vector on the bargaining frontier,
but the associated allocation is not Pareto optimal except for a rare case.
We ﬁrst consider the rare case, and then the general case.
Proposition 6 For each i 2 N, let X¤
i be the amount of the total supply of
emission permits that maximizes the welfare of country i. Under Assumption
17L, if X¤
i = X¤
j := X¤ for all i;j 2 N, then the allocation attained at X¤ is
Pareto optimal.











i are consumption and production of country i achieved at




















































By Proposition 3, 1
q(X¤) = f0
i(y¤
i) for all i 2 N. Notice also that ® = g0
i(c¤
i)















Proposition 7 Let N = f1;2g. For each i 2 N, let X¤
i be the amount
of total supply of emission permits that maximizes the welfare of country
i. Under Assumption L, if X¤
1 6= X¤
2, then for each i 2 N, the allocation
attained at X¤
i is not Pareto optimal.










































































The reason why the bargaining frontier is below the Pareto frontier is as
follows. It is true that production eﬃciency (or equivalently cost minimiza-
tion of a given amount of reduction of greenhouse gases) is ensured through
emission permits trading. As Chichilnisky et al.(2000) observed, however,
overall Pareto optimality requires particular combinations of a total amount
of emissions and a distribution of private goods. Hence, under a given dis-
tribution rule of initial emission permits, only some levels of total emissions
are compatible with Pareto optimality.
5.2 The disagreement point
We next examine the disagreement point in the Nash bargaining theory,
namely the vector of welfare levels that the countries attain if they fail to
reach an agreement in negotiations. In the present model, the disagreement
point may be deﬁned as the vector of Nash equilibrium welfare levels of the
countries in an emission game with no regulation and no emission permits
trading. In the emission game, a strategy of each country is an amount of
emissions of greenhouse gases. Since there is no emission permits trading,
for each country, there is a one-to-one relation between consumption ci and
19emission xi that is derived from the equation xi = fi(ci) + gi(ci). Let ci(xi)
be the consumption level that country i achieves when it emits xi.
Formally, an emission game is a list (S1;:::;Sn;W1;:::;Wn) where for
each i 2 N, Si = R+ is the set of strategies (emissions of greenhouse gases)
and Wi : Rn





A strategy proﬁle (x¤
1;:::;x¤
n) is a Nash equilibrium if for every i 2 N and







As we have shown above, the bargaining frontier is strictly below the
Pareto frontier in the present model. In other words, the set of vectors of
feasible welfare levels in the bargaining “shrinks” from that of technologically
feasible welfare vectors. Hence, it is not clear whether the disagreement
point is located inside the bargaining frontier or not. In fact, it depends on
distribution rules of initial emission permits among the countries.
Next we show that if the distribution rule is the proportional rule to the
Nash equilibrium emissions in the noncooperative emission game, then the
disagreement point is within the bargaining frontier.
Proposition 8 Let (x¤
1;:::;x¤
n) 2 Πi2NSi be a Nash equilibrium in the emis-








Then, under the distribution rule (µ1;:::;µn), the vector of the Nash equilib-
rium welfare levels is inside the bargaining frontier.
Proof. Let X¤ :=
P
h2N x¤
h. Clearly, X¤ is a possible choice in the ﬁrst
stage of the bargaining game. Suppose that X¤ is chosen. Let i 2 N be any
country. By the distribution rule, country i’s initial endowment of emission
permits, denoted ¯ xi, is ¯ xi = µiX¤ = x¤
i. If country i produces ci(x¤
i) and




hence ¯ xi ¡ fi(ci(x¤
i)) ¡ gi(ci(x¤










This means that the consumption ci(x¤
i) is feasible for country i un-




i);X¤) is feasible with the choice X¤ in the ﬁrst
stage of the bargaining game. Since this holds for all i 2 N, the welfare
vector (W ¤
1;:::;W ¤
n) is within the bargaining frontier.
5.3 Trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency
Given a bargaining frontier and a disagreement point, we may apply one of
various solutions in the Nash bargaining theory to predict an outcome of the
international negotiations. Then, the following facts hold:
(i) If the disagreement point is outside the bargaining frontier, then the
outcome of negotiations has to be the point (the Nash equilibrium welfare
levels in the noncooperative emission game), and no cooperative agreement
is made. Clearly, the outcome is not Pareto optimal.
(ii) If the disagreement point is within the bargaining frontier, then some
cooperative agreement is established. It is certain that the outcome Pareto
dominates the Nash equilibrium in the noncooperative emission game. How-
ever, because the bargaining frontier is below the Pareto frontier, the outcome
may not be Pareto optimal.
Both cases result in an ineﬃcient ﬁnal allocation, but the welfare loss in
case (i) is larger than in case (ii). As Proposition 8 shows, if the distribution
rule is the proportional rule to the Nash equilibrium emissions in the nonco-
operative emission game, then case (i) never arises. However, it seems very
diﬃcult to justify this distribution rule on any grounds of equity or fairness.
For many other (equitable) distribution rules, the disagreement point is out-
side the bargaining frontier. Our analysis thus reveals a trade-oﬀ between
equity in distribution rules and eﬃciency in ﬁnal allocations.
6 Numerical examples
This section presents numerical examples in which the outcomes of negoti-
ations are not Pareto optimal.4 We consider two cases. The former corre-
sponds to case (ii) in the previous section, and the latter to case (i).
4We use MATHEMATICA Ver.4.2 for calculations and drawing a ﬁgure in this section.
216.1 Example





gi(ci) = ci (27)
For each i 2 N, the welfare function Vi : R2
+ ! R is deﬁned as:
V1(c1;X) = c
0:8




2 (10 ¡ X)
0:8: (29)
6.2 The Pareto frontier
The Pareto frontier is the locus of the welfare vectors of the two countries
that can be attained technologically. This frontier can be derived from our
extension of the Samuelson condition (Equation (11)). With the above def-
initions of the welfare functions and the emission functions, equation (11)
becomes
(c1 + c2 + 1)(
c1
4
+ 4c2) ¡ 10 +
(c1 + c2)2
2
+ c1 + c2 = 0
We solve this equation for c1 as the function of c2. Then, the total amount




+ c1(c2) + c2:
Hence, the welfare of country i, Wi, is expressed as the function of c2:
W1(c2) = V1(c1(c2);X(c2)) (30)
W2(c2) = V2(c2;X(c2)) (31)
Tracing the vector (W1(c2);W2(c2)) for the variable c2 in an appropriate
interval, we obtain the Pareto frontier.
226.3 The bargaining frontier
Next, we derive the bargaining frontier, namely the locus of the welfare vec-
tors that are attained at various levels of the total emission X with a given
proportional distribution rule and emission permits trading. From equation




















When the total supply of emission permits is X, the equilibrium price is








Let q(X) be the solution. Plugging this as well as some value of µi into (32),
we obtain ci as the function of X, ci(X). Then, substituting ci(X) into the
welfare function of country i, we can express the welfare level of country i as
the function of X. Tracing the welfare vectors of the two countries for the
variable X in [0;10], we derive the bargaining frontier.
Notice that the bargaining frontier depends on (µ1;µ2), namely the share
of initial emission permits for the two countries. We consider several cases
of the values (µ1;µ2).
6.4 The disagreement point
The disagreement point of the Nash bargaining theory for this model should
be the Nash equilibrium welfare levels of the two countries in the emission
game with no regulation. For each i 2 N, and for each given xj (emission of
country j 6= i), the welfare of country i is given by
W1 = c
0:8










23Diﬀerentiating the functions with respect to ci and setting the value at 0, we
obtain the best response functions. Then, the Nash equilibrium consump-
tions, emissions, and welfare levels of the two countries can be derived. The
emission vector at the Nash equilibrium is (x1;x2) = (6:658;0:546); and the
vector of the welfare levels of the two countries (the disagreement point) is
(d1;d2) = (2:248;1:888). The Nash product, (W1 ¡ d1)(W2 ¡ d2), is then
deﬁned, and the contour sets of the Nash product can be drawn.
6.5 Results
The results are shown in Figures 1 and 2. In each ﬁgure, the Pareto frontier
is the outer concave curve, and the bargaining frontier is the inner concave
curve. The disagreement point is indicated by the dot. Figure 1 corresponds
to the case where (µ1;µ2) = (0:925;0:075). This is the case where the distri-
bution rule of initial emission permits is the proportional rule to the Nash
equilibrium emissions in the noncooperative emission game. Figure 2 corre-
sponds to the case where (µ1;µ2) = (0:8;0:2).
In Figure 1, the disagreement point is inside the bargaining frontier, but
the Nash bargaining solution is not Pareto optimal. On the other hand, in
Figure 2, the disagreement point is outside the bargaining frontier. Hence,
cooperative agreement is not at all possible, and clearly the outcome (the
disagreement point) is not Pareto optimal. In this example, approximately
86 to 99 percent of initial permits has to be assigned to country 1, who is less
concerned about the environment, in order for some cooperative agreement
to be possible.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed international negotiations for abatement of
global warming, using the framework of the Nash bargaining theory. First,
we have extended the condition for Pareto optimal allocations to the case
where consumption activities also generate greenhouse gases. Second, we
have built a three-stage model of international negotiations on the level of
total emissions, and examined whether a cooperative agreement is possible,
and if any, the outcome is Pareto optimal or not. We have shown fundamental
diﬃculties in attaining a Pareto optimal allocation.
There are some limits to the analysis in this paper. First, we assume that
24once negotiations break down, all the countries play a non-cooperative emis-
sion game. Hence, our model does not cover the case in which some subset of
the participants reach an agreement while the other countries withdraw from
the negotiations. Second, we ﬁx the participants (the signatories of the Kyoto
Protocol) in negotiations, and ignore the behavior of non-participants (non-
signatories). In fact, before starting negotiations there should be another
stage in which each country decides whether it participates in the mecha-
nism or not.5 It is left for future researches to develop a more general model
which takes account of these factors.
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                Figure 1: The Nash bargaining solution when the share of initial permits is (0.925, 0.075).
                 (The proportional rule to the Nash equilibrium emissions in the noncooperative game.)
                                               
                                                       








                 Figure 2: The Nash bargaining solution when the share of initial permits is (0.8, 0.2)
                              
                                     
                                                                                                                  
                                                            
                                                                                                  27
Figure1and 2 and 3.nb 1